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 ILLNESS AND INABILITY TO REPAY:  
THE ROLE OF DEBTOR HEALTH IN THE 
DISCHARGE OF EDUCATIONAL DEBT 
RAFAEL I. PARDO∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 For a debtor to obtain a discharge of student loans in bankruptcy, 
the debtor must establish that repayment of the loans would impose 
an undue hardship. This Article presents the results of an empirical 
study of bankruptcy court doctrine over a ten-year period that in-
volved undue hardship discharge proceedings where the court re-
ported information on the debtor’s health status, monthly household 
income, and monthly household expenses. The data show that a medi-
cal condition increased a debtor’s odds of being granted a discharge 
by 140%, but that household income and expense levels did not have a 
statistically significant association with legal outcome. These results 
suggest that a great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine regarding the 
discharge of educational debt has given a meaning to the statutory 
term “undue hardship” that is far removed from financial indicia of 
ability to repay. As a consequence, the statute has not been given its 
proper reach and has failed to achieve its proper sorting function—
that is, identifying those debtors without a meaningful ability to re-
pay their educational debt. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 2005, Michelle Lacey and I reported the results of an empirical 
study of the application of bankruptcy court doctrine over a ten-year 
period in determinations involving the discharge of educational debt 
(the 2005 study).1 The data showed that remarkably few statistically 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University. I am grateful to Christopher Co-
tropia, David Hoffman, Jonathan Nash, and Nina Pardo for their helpful suggestions. This 
Article also benefited from the commentary of participants at the 2007 Federal Judicial 
Center’s Workshop for Bankruptcy Judges II and a faculty workshop at Seattle University 
School of Law. 
 1. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 
(2005). 
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significant differences existed between those debtors granted and 
denied a discharge. We concluded that the outcome in the analyzed 
cases could best be explained as the product of differing judicial per-
ceptions of how the same legal standard—undue hardship—applied 
to relatively similarly situated debtors. 
 This Article revisits the data from the 2005 study and explores 
whether some of the differences between debtors granted and denied 
a discharge can account for the legal outcome in a particular subset 
of cases. Part II provides a brief overview of the 2005 study, includ-
ing its salient findings. Part III discusses the subset of cases that 
have been identified for further study in this Article and then pre-
sents the results from a statistical analysis that seeks to predict the 
outcome in undue hardship discharge determinations according to 
three factual circumstances: (1) the debtor’s monthly household in-
come, (2) the debtor’s monthly household expenses, and (3) the 
debtor’s health. Part IV interprets the results and argues that a 
great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine has been misguided in its ef-
fort to classify debtors who have an ability to repay their educational 
debt.  
II.   THE 2005 STUDY 
 The 2005 study drew its data from 261 published and unpublished 
opinions that were issued during the ten-year period beginning on 
October 7, 1993 and ending on October 6, 2003 and that involved dis-
charge determinations of educational debt pursuant to the undue 
hardship standard.2 Since some of these opinions involved multiple 
discharge determinations, the data consisted of 286 discharge deter-
minations.3 The study tracked the demographic and financial charac-
teristics of the debtors who sought to discharge their educational 
debt with two goals in mind: (1) describing the type of individual who 
sought a discharge in order to gain a sense of the degree of hardship 
faced by such an individual,4 and (2) comparing differences between 
those debtors granted and those debtors denied a discharge in order 
to identify the factual circumstances that courts deemed to constitute 
undue hardship.5 These characteristics revealed that the majority of 
the debtors in the study had confronted financial hardship at the 
time they requested a discharge and “did not have a reasonable pros-
                                                                                                                     
 2. The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge certain educational debt unless it 
can be established that “excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2007); see also id. § 1328(a)(2) 
(providing that scope of a Chapter 13 discharge does not include § 523(a)(8) debt). 
 3. For a detailed discussion of the selection criteria implemented in the 2005 study, 
see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 433-38. 
 4. Id. at 439-78. 
 5. Id. at 478-86. 
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pect of repaying their educational debt.”6 However, only 45% of these 
financially distressed debtors received a discharge.7 In seeking to ac-
count for the factual circumstances that would allow a debtor to pre-
vail in a claim of undue hardship, the study found that the demo-
graphic and financial characteristics of debtors granted a discharge 
and debtors denied a discharge were, for the most part, remarkably 
similar. 
 Various financial indicators suggested that the debtors in the 
2005 study did not have a realistic ability to repay their educational 
debt. For example, for the opinions in which the court reported the 
debtor’s net monthly household income,8 the average debtor’s house-
hold generated $2111 per month (in 2003 dollars).9 When converting 
this figure to annual household income and comparing it to the 
amount of household income defined by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) as the poverty line threshold, the 
study found that the average debtor household did not generate suf-
ficient income to double the poverty line threshold.10 Importantly, 
when taking into account monthly household expenses, exclusive of 
educational debt expenses, the average debtor household had a 
monthly deficit of $83.66. Put another way, the average debtor 
household did not have any disposable income to devote to repay-
ment of the debtor’s educational debt. The study also found that the 
average debtor would have had to devote more than two years’ worth 
of net annual household income to repay his or her educational debt 
in full. This further suggested that staggering educational debt loads 
had placed a severe financial strain on the debtors in the study and 
that they had a legitimate need for relief.11 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 477-78. 
 7. Id. at 479. 
 8. The majority of opinions featured in the 2005 study reported a debtor’s income in 
terms of net income. Id. at 457. The 2005 study theorized that net income constituted the 
debtor’s current monthly gross wages, salary, and commissions reduced by the amount of 
any payroll deductions, such as payroll taxes, social security, insurance, and union dues. 
Id. at 453. 
 9. All dollar amounts reported in this Article are in 2003 dollars. 
 10. The 2004 HHS poverty guidelines, which were used in the 2005 study to calculate 
the ratio of the debtor’s annual household income to the poverty line threshold, see Pardo 
& Lacey, supra note 1, at 462, defined the poverty line for the contiguous United States as 
a household with income of $9310 for the first member and $3180 for each additional 
member. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7336, 7336 (Feb. 13, 
2004). Accordingly, for an individual in a single-member household, the inability to gener-
ate sufficient income to double the poverty line threshold would mean that his or her an-
nual household income was less than $18,620. Such proximity to the poverty line conjures 
the image of a debtor living a marginal existence. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
such an individual would not be well poised to make educational debt payments.  
 11. This measure assumes that household income would remain constant, that the 
educational debt would not increase by virtue of interest or other charges, and that the 
debtor’s household would live expense free. For a summary of the financial characteristics 
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 To identify the factual circumstances associated with the grant of 
an undue hardship discharge, the study compared the demographic 
and financial characteristics of debtors granted a discharge (the dis-
charge group) and debtors denied a discharge (the nondischarge 
group). Surprisingly, there were more similarities than dissimilari-
ties between the two groups. Both groups had similar compositions in 
terms of the debtor’s gender, age, marital status, number of depend-
ents, employment status, occupation type, and level of educational 
attainment.12 The only statistically significant demographic differ-
ences between the two groups related to three health-related charac-
teristics. First, the discharge group had a greater percentage of un-
healthy debtors: 72% compared to 54% for the nondischarge group. 
Second, for the subset of debtors with a medical condition, the dis-
charge group had a greater percentage of debtors whose medical con-
dition limited their ability to work: 49% compared to 25% for the non-
discharge group. Third, for the subset of debtors with dependents, 
the discharge group had a higher percentage of debtors responsible 
for an unhealthy family member: 86% compared to 42% for the non-
discharge group.13 
 With respect to financial characteristics, the study also docu-
mented more similarities than dissimilarities between the discharge 
group and the nondischarge group. The study did find that the me-
dian monthly household income and median monthly household ex-
penses of the discharge group were statistically significantly lower 
than the nondischarge group. Specifically, the discharge group had a 
median monthly household income of $1623 in comparison to $2072 
for the nondischarge group, and the discharge group had median 
monthly household expenses of $1837 in comparison to $2313 for the 
nondischarge group. However, no statistically significant differences 
existed with respect to median levels of monthly disposable house-
hold income, educational debt, or the ratio of educational debt to an-
nual household income.14 On the basis of these findings, the study 
concluded that the law had been inconsistently applied to relatively 
similarly situated debtors,15 and it subsequently demonstrated 
through statistical modeling that the outcome of undue hardship dis-
charge determinations in the study could be described as the product 
of varying judicial perceptions of the meaning of undue hardship.16 
                                                                                                                     
of the debtors in the 2005 study, see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 454 tbl.1, and for a 
detailed discussion of these characteristics, see id. at 452-76. 
 12. Id. at 482 tbl.4, 483 tbls.5 & 6. 
 13. Id. at 485 tbl.8. 
 14. Id. at 484 tbl.7. 
 15. Id. at 486. 
 16. Id. at 486-509. 
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 Although the 2005 study revealed that a limited number of factual 
circumstances were associated with the outcome of the undue hard-
ship discharge determinations, it did not seek to fit a statistical 
model that would predict outcome according to these circumstances 
for two reasons. First, not all of the discharge determinations in the 
study reported sufficient information to document these circum-
stances. For example, notwithstanding the statistically significant 
relationship between a debtor’s monthly household income and a 
court’s decision to grant an undue hardship discharge, approximately 
15% of the discharge determinations did not report sufficient infor-
mation on monthly household income.17 Second, some of the statisti-
cally significant factual circumstances were limited to an extremely 
narrow subset of discharge determinations. For example, the rela-
tionship between the health status of a debtor’s dependents and the 
outcome of the discharge determination could only be explored for 
those discharge determinations involving debtors with dependents—
specifically, only 56% of all discharge determinations.18 Moreover, 
only half of these determinations provided sufficiently detailed in-
formation to document the health status of a debtor’s dependents.19 
Accordingly, the relationship between this factor and legal outcome 
could only have been explored in 28% of the discharge determina-
tions. Because of these constraints, the statistical modeling in the 
study instead focused on the conclusions reached by the court with 
respect to the distinct doctrinal factors that constituted the ultimate 
holding on undue hardship.20 This Article now seeks to explore what, 
if anything, statistical modeling based on certain factual characteris-
tics will tell us about the application of the undue hardship standard 
in a subset of discharge determinations from the 2005 study.  
III.   REVISITING UNDUE HARDSHIP IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
 The 2005 study emphasized that, since its data were drawn only 
from undue hardship discharge opinions disseminated to Westlaw 
over a ten-year period,21 it could not be claimed that the data were 
representative of the manner in which courts adjudicated all dis-
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 484 tbl.7. 
 18. Id. at 482 tbl.4. 
 19. Id. at 485 tbl.8. 
 20. The study modeled the decisionmaking process according to three core legal con-
siderations—the debtor’s current inability to repay, the debtor’s future inability to repay, 
and the debtor’s good faith effort to repay—of which at least one was referenced in each 
discharge determination in the study. As a result, the statistical model classified all of the 
discharge determinations in the study. The study then sought to determine the factual cir-
cumstances relevant for assessing each of those considerations, yet once again found that 
factual circumstances played a limited role in accounting for the legal conclusions reached 
by courts. Id. at 486-509. 
 21. Id. at 410 & n.21. 
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charge determinations during that time period.22 In light of that limi-
tation, one might question the value of empirical analysis of a subset 
of these data. The answer is simply this: If evidence of associations 
between certain factual characteristics and legal outcomes can be es-
tablished for a large subset of the data, even when controlling for 
other factors, the emerging patterns will reveal what influenced a 
large number of bankruptcy courts in reaching their dispositions. In 
turn, the propriety of such associations can be evaluated from both a 
normative perspective and a practical perspective. Normatively 
speaking, if past experience demonstrates that courts have inappro-
priately allowed certain facts to give content and meaning to the 
phrase “undue hardship,” or alternatively have failed to give certain 
facts their due weight, then prescriptions can be made that will guide 
future decisionmakers in giving proper reach to the law. Practically 
speaking, if past patterns serve a signaling function to future liti-
gants regarding the likelihood of relief in undue hardship discharge 
determinations,23 or for that matter future decisionmakers, then the 
effect and desirability of such signals should be assessed. 
 This Part presents the results from a binary logistic regression 
model used to predict whether a bankruptcy court granted a debtor 
an undue hardship discharge based on the following independent 
variables: (1) the debtor’s monthly household income, (2) the debtor’s 
monthly household expenses, and (3) the debtor’s health status. Ap-
proximately 60% of the discharge determinations in the dataset from 
2005 study had information for each of these variables.24 The analy-
sis that follows seeks to ascertain whether the associations discov-
ered in the 2005 study with respect to each of these variables persist 
when the variables are jointly incorporated into a statistical model. 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 433-34. 
 23. See Bernard Trujillo, Regulating Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study of Con-
sumer Exemptions Cases, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 574 (2006) (noting in an em-
pirical study of bankruptcy court doctrine in consumer exemptions proceedings over a 
twenty-year period that “patterns [across a large number of cases] tell us not only what 
particular judges accomplished in specific cases, but also what courts have signaled to fu-
ture litigants about . . . debtors’ chance of success” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. Of the 286 discharge determinations in the dataset from the 2005 study, 175 in-
cluded information for the debtor’s health, monthly household income, and monthly house-
hold expenses. However, any observation involving a debtor with an extreme amount of 
monthly household income or monthly household expenses was omitted from the statistical 
model in this Article. For this subset of debtors, any debtor with monthly household in-
come that fell above the third quartile ($2715.47) of the household income data by more 
than three times the interquartile range ($1531.90) for such data was deemed to be an ex-
treme outlier. In similar fashion, any debtor with monthly household expenses that fell 
above the third quartile ($2762.82) of the household expense data by more than three 
times the interquartile range ($1472.82) for such data was deemed to be an extreme out-
lier. Three extreme outliers were identified on the basis of monthly household income and 
none on the basis of monthly household expenses. Thus, the statistical analyses in this Ar-
ticle are based on 172 discharge determinations. 
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The data show that the financial indicators have no statistically sig-
nificant effect on the outcome of the discharge determination. On the 
other hand, a debtor’s health status is a statistically significant pre-
dictor of outcome: If a debtor suffered from a medical condition, the 
existence of that condition increased the debtor’s chances of being 
granted a discharge. A detailed discussion of these findings now fol-
lows. 
 Overall, the model is statistically significant as compared to a 
model without independent variables, and it correctly predicts the 
outcome in approximately 63% of the discharge determinations.25 Of 
course, without referring to any of the independent variables in the 
model, one could correctly classify the outcome in some of these de-
terminations by assigning the most-frequent category of outcome 
(i.e., the marginal distribution of the dependent variable) to all of the 
determinations. In this case, one could correctly classify the outcome 
in 52% of the discharge determinations by guessing nondischarge for 
all determinations.26 Thus, when predicting with the model that in-
cludes the independent variables of the debtor’s monthly household 
income and expenses, as well as the debtor’s health status, the error 
rate drops by approximately 22% (i.e., the adjusted count R2) com-
pared to a prediction based solely on the marginal distribution of the 
dependent variable. 
 When controlling for the effect of all other variables in the model, 
only the debtor’s health status remains a statistically significant 
predictor of an undue hardship discharge. In other words, for these 
discharge determinations, no relationship existed between discharge 
and a debtor’s monthly household income or household expenses. The 
question arises then as to the size of the effect a debtor’s health had 
upon a court’s propensity to grant an undue hardship discharge. The 
model indicates that suffering from a medical condition made a 
debtor’s odds of being granted a discharge 2.40 times higher.27 Put 
another way, holding all other variables constant, the existence of a 
medical condition increased the debtor’s odds of being granted a dis-
charge by 140%.28 
 These findings can further be interpreted using predicted prob-
abilities. Using the actual values for all of the independent variables 
                                                                                                                     
 25. For any observation for which the model predicted a probability of over 50% for 
the outcome of discharge, the model assigned the positive outcome of discharge; for any ob-
servation for which the model predicted a probability of under 50%, the model assigned the 
negative outcome of nondischarge. 
 26. For the 172 observations included in the regression model, the court denied a dis-
charge in 90 of those observations. 
 27. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be as low as 1.27 times and 
as high as 4.52 times. 
 28. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be as low as 27% and as a 
high as 352%. 
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included in the model, the predicted probability of discharge is calcu-
lated. Figure 1 below presents the predicted probabilities for dis-
charge in the actual observations in the regression model through 
use of a histogram that separately displays the distribution of those 
probabilities for healthy debtors and unhealthy debtors. The width of 
each bar represents a specific interval of the predicted probability of 
discharge, and the height of each bar represents the percentage of 
discharge determinations that fall within that interval. For any ob-
servation with a predicted probability of over 50% (i.e., greater than 
0.5), the model assigned the positive outcome of discharge. A com-
parison of the two distributions reveals that, whereas approximately 
86% of the determinations involving unhealthy debtors had greater 
than a 50% predicted probability of a discharge being granted, only 
4% of the determinations involving healthy debtors did so.  
FIGURE 1 
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF DISCHARGE BY  
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dicted to be approximately 57%,29 whereas for a healthy debtor it is 
predicted to be 35%.30 Accordingly, the presence of a medical condi-
tion is predicted to have increased the likelihood of discharge for a 
debtor with average income and expenses by twenty-two percentage 
points. 
 On the basis of these data, it is clear that the status of a debtor’s 
health greatly influenced a court’s decision to grant an undue hard-
ship discharge in 60% of the discharge determinations from the 2005 
study. How should one interpret the primacy of a debtor’s health 
status in influencing the outcome in over half of the discharge de-
terminations documented in opinions issued by bankruptcy courts 
from the end of 1993 through the end of 2003? Moreover, what im-
portance should be given to the failure of financial considerations 
(i.e., monthly household income and household expenses) to play an 
explanatory role in ascertaining whether the nondischarge of educa-
tional debt would impose an undue hardship on a debtor? Part IV 
seeks to answer these questions. 
IV.   RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF DEBTOR HEALTH IN THE 
DISCHARGE OF EDUCATIONAL DEBT 
 This Part interprets the results from the regression analysis pre-
sented in Part III. In doing so, it assesses the effectiveness of the 
manner in which bankruptcy court doctrine has functioned to resolve 
the issue of the discharge of educational debt. Again, it should be 
emphasized that this Article does not purport to provide a definitive 
or exhaustive account of such doctrine. The data only represent 60% 
of a decade’s worth of undue hardship opinions—a snapshot in time. 
Accordingly, caution must be exercised in drawing inferences regard-
ing the representativeness of such data with respect to bankruptcy 
court doctrine on the topic that has subsequently emerged. Keeping 
these limitations in mind, it is not an unreasonable proposition to 
think that the past practice has informed the manner in which bank-
ruptcy judges continue to apply the doctrine that elaborates on the 
meaning of undue hardship, especially as there have not been any 
recent seismic shifts in the doctrine prompted by hierarchical man-
dates from the U.S. Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court. By fo-
cusing on patterns that have emerged over time and discerning their 
import, a more concrete understanding of the doctrine can be 
achieved than if one were to analyze a handful of opinions in isola-
tion. 
                                                                                                                     
 29. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be approximately as low as 
47% and no higher than approximately 67%. 
 30. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be approximately as low as 
24% and no higher than approximately 46%. 
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 In order to understand why a debtor’s illness has played a sub-
stantive role in giving meaning to the term “undue hardship,” a brief 
discussion of the doctrinal framework bankruptcy courts have 
adopted to implement the standard is necessary. Since the Bank-
ruptcy Code fails to define the term,31 courts have formulated tests to 
apply the standard. In Brunner v. New York State Higher Education 
Services Corp.,32 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a 
three-part test (the Brunner test) for undue hardship that requires a 
debtor to establish: 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and 
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her de-
pendents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circum-
stances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist 
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay 
the loans.33 
 With the formal adoption of this framework by eight other federal 
regional circuits,34 this framework has become the dominant mode for 
analyzing a debtor’s claim of undue hardship. Some courts, however, 
have implemented the “totality of the circumstances” test (the total-
ity test), which “requires an analysis of (1) the debtor’s past, present, 
and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) calculation of 
the debtor’s and his dependents’ reasonable necessary living ex-
penses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surround-
ing that particular bankruptcy case.”35 This approach has been en-
dorsed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,36 as well as by courts 
within the First Circuit,37 although the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has not formally adopted an analytical framework for applying the 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 101 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 32. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
 33. Id. at 396. 
 34. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 
(4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 
2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); Hemar Ins. 
Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. As-
sistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Roberson, 999 
F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 35. Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 139 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999). 
 36. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 37. See, e.g., Brunell v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567, 575-76 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); Lamanna v. EFS Servs., Inc. (In re Lamanna), 285 B.R. 347, 353 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 2002); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. 
Me. 2000). 
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undue hardship standard.38 Courts have made a debtor’s health a 
relevant factor under both approaches, and this bears further exami-
nation given that the overwhelming majority of courts in the dis-
charge determinations analyzed in this Article implemented one of 
these two approaches, with 70% applying the Brunner test and 21% 
applying the totality test.39 
 Under the second prong of the Brunner test, a debtor must estab-
lish that additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s 
inability to maintain a minimal standard of living will persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of the educational debt.40 
Courts that have applied the test have considered a debtor’s illness 
to be one type of additional circumstance that would support a find-
ing of a future inability to repay.41 Similarly, under the totality test, 
courts have considered a debtor’s illness as one of several relevant 
factors in assessing undue hardship.42 Some have done so under the 
first prong of the test, which examines the debtor’s past, present, and 
reasonably reliable future financial resources.43 Others have done so 
pursuant to the third prong of the test, which examines any other 
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the debtor’s case.44 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 
2006) (“We see no need in this case to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identi-
fying a case of ‘undue hardship.’ ”). Neither has the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 
First Circuit formally adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test. See Smith v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R. 605, 611 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005). 
 39. It should be noted that neither test proved to be more forgiving than the other for 
the discharge determinations analyzed in this Article. Approximately half of the debtors 
whose undue hardship claim was analyzed pursuant to the Brunner test received a dis-
charge, whereas approximately 44% of the debtors whose undue hardship claim was ana-
lyzed pursuant to the totality test received a discharge. This difference is not statistically 
significant.  
 40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385-86 
(6th Cir. 2005); Triplett v. ACS/PNC Educ. Loan Ctr. (In re Triplett), 357 B.R. 739, 743 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006); Simmons v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Simmons), No. 06-3012, 2006 
WL 2556581, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2006); Clark v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re 
Clark), 341 B.R. 238, 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); Mosley v. Gen. Revenue Corp. (In re 
Mosley), 330 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005); Lowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In 
re Lowe), 321 B.R. 852, 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004); Folsom v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re 
Folsom), 315 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004); Hafner v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. 
(In re Hafner), 303 B.R. 351, 356 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); Hoskins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Hoskins), 292 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003); Pace v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Pace), 288 B.R. 788, 792 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); Thoms v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Thoms), 257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); Jones v. Nat’l Pay-
ment Ctr. (In re Jones), 242 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). 
 42. See, e.g., Anelli v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Anelli), 262 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2000). 
 43. See, e.g., Limkemann v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Limkemann), 314 B.R. 190, 194-
95 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004). 
 44. See, e.g., Albee v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Albee), 338 B.R. 407, 410-11, 413 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). 
516  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:505 
 
 Notwithstanding that a debtor’s health is a relevant consideration 
under current doctrine, should it be so, and, if so, what weight should 
be afforded to it? Answering whether a debtor’s health should be a 
relevant consideration in the undue hardship inquiry necessarily in-
volves figuring out its relationship to a debtor’s ability to repay his or 
her educational debt. Courts have observed that, since illness can 
negatively impact a debtor’s ability to work, a debtor who suffers 
from a medical condition may not be well poised to generate suffi-
cient income in the future to repay his or her educational debt.45 
This, however, is only one way in which a medical condition may 
prevent repayment. Uninsured medical costs have been documented 
to be one of the leading causes of bankruptcy filings,46 and, perhaps 
not surprisingly, many of the opinions in the 2005 study contained 
references to debtors who could not afford health insurance.47 In light 
of these considerations, it seems eminently reasonable to conclude 
that the status of a debtor’s health should play a role in an undue 
hardship discharge determination. But should it play as central a 
role as it did in 60% of the doctrine that emerged from bankruptcy 
courts in the decade spanning 1993 to 2003? 
 At its core, an undue hardship discharge determination seeks to 
answer whether the debtor requesting relief will have the ability to 
repay his or her educational debt without suffering impermissible 
sacrifice—namely, undue hardship.48 This, of course, requires a court 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir. 
2004) (noting that “a permanent medical condition will certainly contribute to the unlikeli-
hood of a debtor earning enough money to repay her student loan debt”); In re Clark, 341 
B.R. at 253 (“[A] strong nexus between the medical condition and its adverse effect on the 
debtor’s employment, specifically the debtor’s income, must be demonstrated. If health 
problems contribute to a debtor’s sub-minimal standard of living, then the prospect for re-
covery and defrayal of medical expenses within the repayment period are relevant.” (cita-
tion omitted)); cf. In re Hafner, 303 B.R. at 356 (“The focus is whether the medical condi-
tions are so serious that a debtor’s ability to repay is impaired for the duration of the obli-
gation. . . . What matters is the effect that impairment has upon a debtor’s ability to obtain 
and sustain adequate financial resources in the future.”). 
 46. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 141-71 (2000); Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth 
Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of Medical-Related Finan-
cial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & 
Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001).  
 47. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 448 & n.192. For an example of a court that 
has recognized that medical costs borne by the debtor may support a claim of undue hard-
ship, albeit under a narrow set of circumstances, see Wilson v. Missouri Higher Education 
Loan Authority (In re Wilson), 177 B.R. 246, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (“ ‘Undue hard-
ship’ must mean more than unpleasantness associated with repayment of a just debt. Gen-
erally, there must be a showing of exceptional or unique circumstances—e.g., that the 
debtor must bear the burden of heavy medical expenses while living at the poverty 
level . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 48. Put another way, “the undue hardship examination should have as its essential 
starting point one simple question: Is there a reasonable prospect that the debtor will ever 
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to predict on the basis of a variety of factors the likelihood that the 
financial distress suffered by the debtor will persist into the future.49 
As suggested by the 2005 study, very few factual circumstances ap-
peared to be associated with the outcome of discharge determina-
tions.50 Further statistical analysis has revealed that, of the three 
most prevalent factors (i.e., the debtor’s health status, monthly 
household income, and monthly household expenses), only a debtor’s 
health status had a statistically significant association with legal 
outcome.51 As outlined above, this factor should have an effect on le-
gal outcome,52 but it should not be the only factor that does so.  
                                                                                                                     
be able to repay . . . ?” Mallinckrodt v. Chem. Bank (In re Mallinckrodt), 260 B.R. 892, 898 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001), rev’d, 274 B.R. 560 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 49. See Lieberman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Lieberman), Bankr. No. 00-
50978, Adv. No. 02-5018, 2003 WL 21397713, at *9 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 3, 2003) (“Sim-
ply stated, one must take the debtor in an educational-loan dischargeability proceeding ex-
actly as he presents himself, vocational profile, medical condition, net worth, actual earn-
ings, family responsibilities, and all. Then, one must make a reasonable prognostication as 
to the debtor’s future ability to generate a meaningful income surplus.”). 
 50. See supra Part II. 
 51. See supra Part III. 
 52. It bears mentioning that formal incorporation of a debtor’s health status into the 
analytical framework for analyzing undue hardship may have produced an unintended 
consequence—namely, making it more difficult for debtors who claim undue hardship on 
the basis of illness to satisfy their burden of proof. While some courts do not require a 
debtor to produce expert testimony to corroborate the existence of a medical condition, see, 
e.g., Hoskins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hoskins), 292 B.R. 883, 887-88 (Bankr. 
C.D. Ill. 2003); Mayer v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116, 
121 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), others have intimated that such testimony may be re-
quired for a debtor to satisfy his or her burden of proof, see, e.g., Burkhead v. United States 
(In re Burkhead), 304 B.R. 560, 565 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (“Although the Debtor testified 
about the seriousness of her medical condition and modest living arrangements, she did 
not call any expert witnesses to testify about her long-term prognosis.”); VanderMast v. 
Educ. Res. Inst. (In re VanderMast), Bankr. No. 00-13445-JMD, Adv. No. 01-1074-JMD, 
2002 WL 1402535, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.H. June 27, 2002) (“The Debtor did testify about her 
health problems and her testimony indicates that she expects her health problems to con-
tinue into the future. However, the Debtor did not present any evidence from a medical ex-
pert regarding the Debtor’s prospects of recovery and ability to return to a more normal 
lifestyle.”); Kelsey v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Kelsey), 287 B.R. 132, 143 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2001) (“[T]his Court closely scrutinizes claims for undue hardship based on 
psychological or emotional disability due to the susceptibility of such claims to fabrication, 
exaggeration and fraud. Well qualified and substantiated expert testimony is essential.”); 
cf. Craig Peyton Gaumer, Use Expert Witness Testimony in Student Loan Hardship Dis-
charge Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2004, at 8 (arguing that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence require expert testimony to support an undue hardship claim based on medical 
conditions). Given that debtors who seek an undue hardship discharge are likely to lack 
the resources necessary to litigate the matter generally, see 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, 
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 212 (1997) (“It hardly is surprising that some 
courts see few requests for hardship discharges of educational loans given the pitfalls of 
the undue hardship standard. The borrowers most likely to prevail in many courts are 
those with the least possibility of being able to litigate the question. The risk of losing is 
also high. Failure to meet the burden of proof leaves the debtor with the student loan debts 
and substantial litigation expenses.” (footnote omitted)), courts have recognized the para-
dox that arises from a rule requiring debtors to present expert testimony, which entails 
more financial resources, to support an undue hardship claim based on a medical condi-
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 At bottom, financial characteristics should play a dominant role. 
The amounts an individual has earned and spent in the past should 
be probative of ability to repay—at least as much as the health 
status of that individual, if not more so. In fact, in order to identify 
those debtors who should not be eligible for Chapter 7 relief because 
of their ability to repay prebankruptcy debts, Congress has placed 
emphasis on the predictive power of past financial considerations by 
creating a means test structured around the concept of “current 
monthly income,”53 an amount based on an historical six-month aver-
age of the debtor’s income.54 While this is not to say that bankruptcy 
courts ought to implement a formulaic approach in structuring their 
inquiry into a debtor’s ability to repay pursuant to the undue hard-
ship standard, courts must start applying the standard in such a way 
that financial criteria have a statistically significant bearing on legal 
outcome. 
 One way to do so would be to adopt an approach similar to the 
statutory presumption of undue hardship that arises in the context of 
reaffirmation agreements when a debtor’s disposable income is less 
than the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt.55 While it has 
been argued elsewhere that this presumption should inform the 
meaning of undue hardship in the educational debt context,56 that is 
not the point here. Rather, the suggestion is offered as one way in 
which uniformity could be brought to the doctrine by focusing on cer-
tain financial criteria.57 If courts were to adopt such an approach, one 
would expect to witness a statistically significant relationship be-
tween a debtor’s disposable income and the legal outcome of the dis-
charge determination. The point remains, however, that financial in-
dicia of ability to repay have not been associated with legal outcome, 
and that is troubling. A closer examination of the financial indicators 
in the discharge determinations analyzed in this Article reveals how 
                                                                                                                     
tion, see, e.g., Burton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Burton), 339 B.R. 856, 877 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2006) (“Cases that involve debtors that lack the resources to pay experts to testify 
at trial as to debtors’ medical conditions undoubtably [sic] create a paradox.”); Doherty v. 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Doherty), 219 B.R. 665, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(noting that “dischargeability litigation involves real persons who are debtors under the 
Bankruptcy Code, and cannot afford to hire medical experts to testify to the effect of their 
disease on their earning capacity”); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands), 
166 B.R. 299, 311 n.22 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).   
 53. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 54. See id. § 101(10A)(A). 
 55. See id. § 524(m)(1). 
 56. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 510-14. 
 57. Another possibility would be for courts to focus on the debtor’s income in relation 
to the federal poverty guidelines, an approach introduced by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania but ultimately rejected by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals. See id. at 521 n.447. 
2008] ILLNESS AND INABILITY TO REPAY 519 
 
bankruptcy courts have failed to sort debtors based on ability to re-
pay.  
 Since courts have interpreted congressional intent underlying the 
undue hardship discharge provision to be the prevention of abuse of 
the bankruptcy system by student loan debtors,58 it is useful to as-
sess how well bankruptcy courts have performed the sorting function 
by reference to the statute’s perceived purpose. Whether a bank-
ruptcy court effectuates the statute’s perceived purpose can be un-
derstood as a function of the relationship between (1) the type of 
debtor (based on repayment ability) making a claim of undue hard-
ship and (2) the outcome of the debtor’s discharge determination. Ta-
ble 1 depicts this relationship.59 
TABLE 1: THE SORTING FUNCTION OF UNDUE HARDSHIP 
 DISCHARGE DETERMINATION OUTCOME 
DEBTOR TYPE (A) Discharge Granted (B) Discharge Denied 
(1) Able to Repay Improper Sorting Proper Sorting 
(2) Unable to Repay Proper Sorting Improper Sorting 
 Assuming that, by establishing the undue hardship threshold, 
Congress truly sought to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system by 
student loan debtors, then only debtors with an ability to repay (Row 
1) should be a legitimate target of the undue hardship provision—
that is, all such debtors should be denied an undue hardship dis-
charge. Debtors who are unable to repay their educational debt (Row 
2) should be beyond the reach of the statute. Accordingly, bankruptcy 
courts properly execute the sorting function when they deny a dis-
charge to debtors who have an ability to repay (Cell B1) and grant a 
discharge to debtors who have an inability to repay (Cell A2). Con-
versely, they improperly execute the sorting function when they 
grant a discharge to debtors who have an ability to repay (Cell A1) 
and deny a discharge to debtors who have an inability to repay (Cell 
B2). 
                                                                                                                     
 58. It should be noted that the historical record suggests an absence of unequivocal 
intent to this effect. See id. at 419-28. 
 59. This approach is derived from Trujillo, supra note 23, at 572-74. 
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 As a thought experiment, let us postulate that a debtor with the 
following profile would be a prime candidate for being deemed to 
have an ability to repay his or her educational debt: a debtor (1) with 
disposable income, (2) whose household generates sufficient income 
to double the poverty line threshold, and (3) who would have to de-
vote one year’s worth or less of household income to repay his or her 
educational debt in full.60 Using this profile as a metric of repayment 
ability, how did bankruptcy courts perform the sorting function in 
the 172 discharge determinations analyzed in this Article? Table 2 
presents the results, listing the actual numbers with the cell per-
centages in parentheses. 
TABLE 2:  
SORTING UNDUE HARDSHIP DEBTORS:  
A HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCT 
 DISCHARGE DETERMINATION OUTCOME 
DEBTOR TYPE (A) Discharge Granted (B) Discharge Denied 
(1) Able to Repay 2 (1.16) 
9 
(5.23) 
(2) Unable to Repay 80 (46.51) 
81 
(47.09) 
                                                                                                                     
 60. The use of financial indicators such as these to predict repayment ability should 
be accompanied by an inquiry into the amount of time that the repayment obligation has 
been outstanding. Because the indicators represent a financial snapshot, they may produce 
a distorted picture. The amount of time that the debtor has had an obligation to repay but 
failed to do so can help illuminate whether there has been a distortion. This type of evi-
dence allows an assessment of whether the financial indicators are consistent with an his-
torical inability to repay. 
 The undue hardship opinions in the 2005 study generally did not provide sufficiently 
detailed information to account for the amount of time that the debtor’s repayment obliga-
tion had been due and owing. A rough approximation can be obtained, however, by consid-
ering the debtor’s age in relation to the level of educational attainment. For the 172 dis-
charge determinations analyzed in this Article, 125 determinations (73%) provided suffi-
ciently detailed information to code for the debtor’s age and educational attainment. The 
average age for this subset of debtors was 41.5 years old, and the median age was 41 years 
old. Since the majority of these debtors (61%) did not obtain a level of education higher 
than a bachelor’s degree, it seems reasonable to conclude that many of the debtors had 
been in repayment status for quite some time. 
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 It should be noted that, pursuant to the repayment metric defined 
above, only 6% of the debtors should have been deemed to have an 
ability to repay, which would mean that the other 94% litigated over 
a provision that was not intended to apply to them. While it may be 
argued that this repayment metric defines ability to repay too nar-
rowly, it should be noted that, of the analyzed discharge determina-
tions that reached a legal conclusion regarding a debtor’s current 
ability to repay,61 85% concluded that the debtor did not have such an 
ability.   
 As Table 1 indicated, the outcomes in Cells A2 and B1 represent 
proper application of the statute. Accordingly, under this hypotheti-
cal construct, courts gave the undue hardship standard its proper 
reach in slightly more than half of the discharge determinations. On 
the other hand, approximately 48% of the determinations (Cells A1 
and B2) entailed an improper sorting of debtors. Perhaps most strik-
ing, all but two of those determinations involved nonabusive student 
loan debtors. For the 81 debtors with an inability to repay who were 
nonetheless denied a discharge (Cell B2), the average debtor in this 
group lived in a household that had a monthly deficit of $153, a 
household whose income was only 1.8 times that of the poverty line 
threshold, and a household that would have had to devote 2.7 years’ 
worth of its income to repay the debtor’s educational debt in full.62 
Thus, while courts were effective gatekeepers in preventing abuse of 
the bankruptcy system, it would appear they cast an overly broad net 
that captured a significant number of debtors in true need of finan-
cial relief.63 
 Perhaps these findings should not be so surprising. Empirical evi-
dence exists that bankruptcy courts have not been successful in pre-
dicting a debtor’s future repayment ability in a different context—
Chapter 13. In Chapter 13, a debtor generally receives a discharge 
                                                                                                                     
 61. There were 163 such discharge determinations. 
 62. The financial characteristics of the average debtor in the discharge group that 
would be deemed to have an inability to repay based on the postulated repayment metric 
(Cell A2) are only slightly worse. The average debtor in this group lived in a household 
with a monthly deficit of $222 and with income that was only 1.5 times that of the poverty 
line threshold. On the other hand, one might conclude that this group was better off given 
that the average debtor’s household would have had to devote 2.3 years’ worth of its in-
come (i.e., less than the nondischarge group) to repay the debtor’s educational debt in full.   
 63. This echoes one of the conclusions of the 2005 study: 
 While bankruptcy courts have perceived the Bankruptcy Code’s 
undue hardship provision to have been enacted by Congress as a neces-
sary measure to curb abuse of the bankruptcy system, the data have 
shown that the statute has proved to be much less selective, primarily 
because of its inherently overbroad scope. The inevitable result has 
been a law applied, counter to its purported objective, to a class of indi-
vidual whose behavior could not have been deemed by Congress to be a 
legitimate target for legislative reform.  
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 479. 
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after completing a repayment plan pursuant to which a portion of his 
or her future income has been devoted to repaying the claims of 
creditors.64 In order for a debtor’s repayment plan to be confirmed, 
the court must make a finding of financial feasibility, including that 
“the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan.”65 
Thus, all confirmed Chapter 13 plans embody the court’s judgment 
that the debtor’s repayment efforts over no longer than a five-year 
period will succeed.66 
 A recent empirical study of Chapter 13 documented that, of the 
613 confirmed cases in the study’s sample, 351 of those cases were ei-
ther dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.67 In other words, bank-
ruptcy courts erroneously determined the financial feasibility of fu-
ture repayment by the debtor in 57% of the confirmed cases. If bank-
ruptcy courts cannot properly gauge repayment ability in the rela-
tively controlled environment of Chapter 13 where various constitu-
encies with different stakes are given the opportunity to object to 
plan confirmation,68 where the repayment plan may be modified after 
confirmation in response to changed circumstances,69 and where the 
repayment period will not exceed five years, then why should they 
fare any better in undue hardship discharge determinations that re-
quire them to forecast repayment ability over a period that can be as 
long as thirty years? 
 For a judge, there may be an intuitive appeal to focus on a 
debtor’s health in assessing repayment ability insofar as it may be 
easier to validate internally the prediction of inability to repay. We 
have all witnessed someone who has suffered from a medical condi-
tion and the manner in which it can interfere with everyday living. 
But courts should be cautious not to rely too much on a debtor’s 
health as a proxy for repayment ability. As illustrated above, refer-
ence to a debtor’s medical condition as part of the undue hardship 
inquiry may result in the improper sorting of debtors. Moreover, a 
debtor’s health as the major determinant of a finding of undue hard-
ship raises serious concerns about judicial activism. While no court 
has announced a per se rule that suffering from a medical condition 
constitutes undue hardship, the legal doctrine studied in this Article 
approaches this decision standard. Were courts to adopt such an out-
come-determinative rule, it would impermissibly encroach into the 
                                                                                                                     
 64. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1328(a) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 66. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(d). 
 67. See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repay-
ment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 506 tbl.19 (2006). 
 68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (granting trustee and unsecured creditors standing to 
object to Chapter 13 plan). 
 69. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1329(a). 
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legislative sphere by creating a categorical class of debtor entitled to 
an undue hardship discharge.70 Lest bankruptcy courts exceed the 
scope of their judicial power, it is imperative that other determinants 
give content to the meaning of undue hardship.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Bankruptcy courts have been assigned the unenviable task of pre-
dicting the future suffering of individuals who seek relief from their 
educational debt. One, and only one, factual circumstance has 
emerged in a great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine as the major de-
terminant of the legal outcome in undue hardship discharge proceed-
ings—a debtor’s health status. As a result of this focus, the doctrine 
has lost its mooring to the essential question sought to be answered 
in such determinations: “Will repayment of the educational debt im-
pose an undue hardship on the debtor?” If past evidence has demon-
strated that a debtor has been subject to financial distress at the 
time he or she makes a claim for relief, absent positive evidence that 
the debtor’s situation will improve, it seems sensible to conclude that 
the debtor’s financial situation will persist if relief is not granted. 
Notwithstanding the inevitable coordination problem faced by bank-
ruptcy courts that operate in distinct judicial districts and circuits, 
the bankruptcy system ought to strive to bring a measure of consis-
                                                                                                                     
 70. One need look no further than the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on equitable 
subordination in support of this conclusion. In United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 
(1996), and United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 
(1996), the Supreme Court reviewed two separate bankruptcy court decisions that equita-
bly subordinated certain IRS tax penalty claims to the claims of general unsecured credi-
tors, merely on the basis of the nature of the IRS’s claims and not with regard to the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case. As I have commented previously:  
Both cases stand for the proposition that a bankruptcy court may not sub-
ordinate categorically whole classes of claims and thereby transgress the 
line distinguishing adjudication from legislation. The decisions reflect the 
Supreme Court’s concern that any categorical subordination of claims would 
exceed the constitutional limits on judicial power and encroach upon Con-
gress’s Article I powers. 
Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable 
Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1494-95 (2000) (footnote omitted). There is every 
reason to believe that the Supreme Court would view the creation of a categorical class of 
debtors entitled to discharge under the undue hardship standard to be equally impermissi-
ble as the categorical subordination of IRS tax penalty claims under the Code’s equitable 
subordination provision. 
 Interestingly, a strand of undue hardship discharge doctrine holds (for all intents and 
purposes) that a debtor’s failure to participate in one of the federal government’s repay-
ment plans, such as the income contingent repayment plan, will preclude a finding of un-
due hardship. See Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need No 
Stinking Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income 
Contingent Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 92-94 (2005). A decision standard 
such as this would also run afoul of the principles set forth in Noland and Reorganized 
CF&I Fabricators. 
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tency to the undue hardship doctrine by rooting it in financial predic-
tors of ability to repay. 
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APPENDIX 
BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
OF UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE 
VARIABLE Discharge 
Monthly Household Income 0.9995 (0.9990, 1.0000)  
Monthly Household Expenses 1.0003 (0.9998, 1.0009) 
Debtor Health Status** 2.3961 (1.2691, 4.5240) 
Observations 172 
Log likelihood -113.313 
McFadden’s R² 0.0481 
Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confi-
dence interval in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether the court granted 
the debtor a discharge, whether in full or in part, with denial of discharge coded 0 
and grant of discharge coded 1. The third independent variable (“Debtor Health 
Status”) tracks whether the debtor suffered from either a physical or mental condi-
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